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 Ted is a forty-three-year-old white male who has had no significant health issues in his 
life. He is, and has been, married to forty-five-year-old Sarah for ten years, and while they have 
had some issues, Ted has always been there for her. The couple lives together in Chicago, 
Illinois. Sarah is a nurse that, unfortunately, has not had the same luck as her husband when it 
comes to her overall health. She was diagnosed with diabetes when she was in her late 
adolescence. For nearly twenty-five years, Sarah was able to manage the disease with no serious 
side effects to her body. Once in her mid-thirties, however, she began developing kidney 
problems and was diagnosed with chronic kidney disease (CKD). Slowly, her kidneys stopped 
performing the functions they once had.  
Recently, Sarah’s CKD developed into end-stage renal disease (ERSD) and she is now in 
need of either dialysis or a kidney transplant. Sarah starts on dialysis, but places her name on the 
kidney transplant recipient waitlist as well. While the dialysis is her saving grace for some time, 
it begins to not work as effectively. Sarah is told by her doctors to explore options within her 
immediate family and close friends to see if any of them are a match for a kidney transplant and 
willing to participate in the procedure. While Sarah feels uncomfortable asking for such a life-
altering request, she knows it is her best bet.  
 Ted goes with his wife to the transplant wing of Northwestern University Medical Center 
to get preliminary blood work done to find out if he is a match. A few days later, the hospital 
calls and tells Ted that his kidney is compatible.  Though excited to tell his wife, the doctor 
suggests that Ted comes to the hospital to discuss the donation process privately.  
 Once at the hospital, Ted meets with the transplant surgeon who informs him that while 
his blood is compatible with his wife’s, there are many other steps that need to be done before 
the transplant can take place. The doctor hands Ted some forms and informative pamphlets 
which illustrate the process. He tells Ted to take the materials home, read them over, and get 
back to him as soon as he is ready with any questions or to make a decision to carry on with the 
process. 
 Upon reading the information he was given by the doctor, Ted is taken aback by the 
number of blood tests, x-rays, and overall lifestyle restrictions that will occur as a result of him 
being a donor. His eyes scroll through the numerous pages of the paperwork, where, at some 
point, he comes across one section titled “Risk Behaviors”. The section posed fourteen questions 
pertaining to his behavioral history, including, but not limited to, drug use, sexual activity, and 
exposure to HIV. It explains beneath the list of inquires that participation in any of the named 
activities would result in his organ being designated an “increased risk”.1 Ted reads on and learns 
that the designation means that his organ requires “special informed consent” from the organ 
recipient because it carries a greater likelihood of carrying transmissible, blood borne pathogens, 
that may not have been present during the screening process, but could arise prior to 
transplantation.
2
 This period of time is referred to as the “window period” for infection.3  The 
document further explains that in order for the transplant to occur at this hospital, Northwestern 
Medical must disclose to the recipient the behavior associated with the increased risk status of 
the organ. Ted thinks back a year and a half when his marriage was a bit shaky and he had made 
                                                          
1
 Matthew J. Kuehnert, Ingi Lee, Debbie L. Seem, Craig A. Umscheid , PHS Guideline for Reducing Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B Virus, Hepatitis C Virus Transmission Through Organ Transplantation, 128 
PUB.HEALTH REP. 247, 251 (2013), available at http://www.publichealthreports.org/issueopen.cfm?articleID=2975. 
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 ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., POLICY 4.2-
REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMED CONSENT REGARDING RISK OF TRANSMISSIBLE DISEASE, at 4-1 (2013), available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_16.pdf. 
3
 See, Kuehnert, supra note 1, at 260; See also, N. Beauvais, J. Franklin, E.J. Gordon J. Hanneman, M.G. Ison, S. 
Jensen G. McNatt, D. Penrod, L. Sherman, N. Theodoropoulos, The Challenge of Informed Consent for Increased 
Risk Living Donation and Transplantation, 11 AM. J. OF TRANSPLANTATION 2569, 2570 (2011), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1600-6143.2011.03814.x/pdf. 
the mistake of cheating on his wife. Ted had used the services of a prostitute on multiple 
occasions, though had not done so for the past year. The Northwestern risk behavior form states 
that paying for sex at any point in the past three years is a risk behavior which will result in an 
increased risk designation of the organ, and thus require special informed consent from the 
recipient and disclosure of the risk behavior associated with it.
4
 
Ted now faces a startling dilemma. His wife, Sarah, has been put on the kidney recipient 
waitlist, with nearly 80,000 individuals, where she faces the grim reality that an organ match and 
transplant could take five years, longer, or may not come at all.
5
 Sarah is also seeking kidneys 
from other sources. Ted can, of course, choose to agree to the disclosure, however, the nature of 
their relationship being the prime motivation for donation, divulging this information could 
hamper or prevent donation and ruin his marriage.   
These two interests, the right of the recipient to be fully informed when making a medical 
decision and the privacy rights of the organ donor, are at odds and formulate the question herein 
addressed. The scenario illustrated above is what could occur if legal informed consent in living 
organ transplantation requires every transplant center to disclose to the recipient the behavior 
associated with an increased risk organ. While the relationship between the donor and recipient 
is not always a spousal one, it remains that the revelation of private information can still hamper 
bonds and expose the donor to stigmatization.
6
  Additionally consider the coercive effect on the 
donor’s decision to donate of a policy which will not allow a donation to occur unless one agrees 
to allow the disclosure of private information.
7
 A donor will feel compelled to reveal private 
                                                          
4
 See Kuehnert, supra note 1, at 251. 
5
 United Network for Organ Sharing, www.unos.org (last visited December 1, 2013). 
6
 See Beauvais, supra note 3, at 2571, 2572. 
7
See Beauvais, supra note 3, at 2571; But cf., Richard H. Dees, Transparent Vessels?: What Organ Donors Should 
be Allowed to Know About Their Recipients, 41 J. LAW, MEDICINE AND ETHICS 323, 327 (2013) (stating that were a 
information because someone’s life is at stake.8 This conflicts with the voluntary aspect of 
donation which promotes participation in the process for the purpose of doing a good deed.
9
  
 The argument, in part, for disclosure is that the information is material and necessary for 
organ recipients to make a “fully informed”, autonomous decision.10  The recipient should, after 
all, feel absolutely comfortable with the decision to accept an organ. However the donors have 
privacy rights and expectations, and these rights are afforded great protections as to their 
personal medical information.
11
 The legal issue then becomes, Does the organ recipient have a 
legal right to the personal information of the living organ donor?  
 I am not convinced that the need for such information outweighs the importance of 
protecting the individual privacy of the organ donor. Therefore, I submit that 1) an organ 
recipient’s interest in the information is not paramount to the organ donor’s privacy rights, and 2) 
that the organ recipient is fully informed under the law even while withholding the risk behavior 
associated with the organ donor.  
   A number of legal and ethical concerns arise in the context of live-organ donation, each 
worthy of being addressed. I will begin my analysis by briefly introducing the Organ 
Procurement  and Transplantation  Network (OPTN), its functions, and the goals which dictate 
its daily activities.  By understanding the many entities and individuals involved in the 
transplantation process, one will better grasp the mission of the OPTN, the justification for its 
current governing rules, and the legal analysis which follows.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
donor permitted to know the recipients private information, the recipient would feel compelled to disclose), 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jlme.12023/pdf.  
8
 See Beauvais, supra note 3, at 2571, 2572. 
9
 See Dees, supra note 6, at 324. 
10
 See Gordon ET AL., supra note 3, at 2570. 
11
 Id. 
Following this introduction, the second portion of the paper will outline and analyze the 
current rules and policies of the OPTN and CMS which govern this legal issue. This will include 
policies pertaining to informing and evaluating the potential living donor, protecting the donors’ 
and recipients’ rights, and the information which is required to obtain the informed consent of a 
potential organ recipient. It will be seen that great leeway is given to the respective transplant 
programs and surgeons in carrying out their interpretations of the rules.
12
 Dual regulation of the 
transplant community by the OPTN and CMS has led to transplant programs being uncertain in 
how to develop in-house procedures that meet the requirements of both and how to address 
overlaps in rule-making.
13
 
In part three, I will address the role the common law has played in the development of 
informed consent. Pertinent to this section is grasping the concepts and rules of informed consent 
that developed through case law. Rules will be taken from the common law and applied to the 
context of the living donor issue. The goal of this section is to consider the rules set forth by the 
OPTN and CMS and determine whether the information supplied to transplant candidates would 
satisfy the informed consent requirements dictated at common law. 
Lastly, I will introduce an alternative to requiring risk behavior disclosure. This section 
will describe a current program that is being used by the OPTN which could allow donors to aid 
in providing an organ to the recipient whom they know, while not having to reveal any risk 
behaviors. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 See Gordon ET AL., supra note 3, at 2571. 
13
 Id. 
Part I-THE ORGAN PROCURMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK (OPTN) 
As the plausibility of organ transplantation grew in America, so did the interest and 
recognition of it’s potential by the general public, the healthcare community, and government 
officials.
14
 A federal initiative was undertaken to create an organization that would establish a 
network of organ transplantation entities to be governed under uniform policies, allowing organ 
procurement to grow expeditiously throughout the country.
15
 Of particular concern, was the need 
to create a database which would identify organ donors and recipients, as well as arrange for the 
acquisition, preservation, and procurement of the harvested organs.
16
 The National Organ 
Transplant Act of 1984 created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) 
and ordered the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate any and all rules 
necessary to carry out its mission.
17
  In 1986, the Secretary contracted a non-profit, 
administrative agency, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), to carry out the OPTN 
mission and functions.
18
 Presently, UNOS remains the entity which manages the OPTN.
19
 
UNOS and the OPTN are responsible for enabling and maintaining an organized and 
efficient network capable of, amongst many other duties, developing and implementing policies 
to ensure the equitable allocation of available organs, keeping up with scientific and 
technological developments in the transplant community, and detecting weaknesses in the organ 
                                                          
 
14
 DAVID L. WEIMER, MEDICAL GOVERNANCE: VALUES, EXPERTISE, AND INTERESTS IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 
44-46 (2010). 
15
 Id. at 46-47. 
16
 Id.  
17
 National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, §372(a), 98 Stat. 2339, 2344 (1984), available at 
http://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/PL98-507.pdf. 
18
 WEIMER, supra note 9, at 47. 
19
 Id. 
network by gathering and analyzing data.
20  The entities and individuals that are members of the 
organization include transplant hospitals, organ procurement organizations, physicians in the 
transplant community, transplant coordinators, histocompatibility labs, as well as individuals 
who have participated in the donation process directly or indirectly.
21
 The organization has since 
been responsible for over 500,000 successful living and deceased donor transplantations 
nationwide since 1987, saving numerous lives and playing a key role in the scientific 
development of the logistically and medically complex procedure.
22
  
Lastly, the enforceable powers granted to the OPTN through legislation are worthy of 
addressing. The OPTN does have the authority to discipline its member organizations for failing 
to abide by OPTN policies and bylaws.
23
 This is done though removal of voting rights, dismissal 
from board representation, and administering and monitoring a strict compliance program that 
the violating member must follow to be placed back in good standing with the organization.
24
 
However, the OPTN cannot suspend or permanently remove the transplant privileges of the 
member for violations. 
25
 This can only be accomplished through recommendations made to the 
Secretary of HHS who, ultimately, decides whether or not to take such action based on the 
information she receives and the severity of the offense.
26
 Nonetheless, the ability of the OPTN 
to publicly dispense the violative conduct of its members serves as a strong tool to promote 
enforcement of OPTN policies.  
                                                          
20
 National Organ Transplant Act §372; See also, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, ARTICLES OF 
INCORPORATION (June 2009), available at http://www.unos.org/docs/UNOS_ArticlesOfIncorporation_062309.pdf. 
21
 42 C.F.R. §121.3(b) (2012).  
22
 UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT (2012), available at 
http://www.unos.org/docs/AnnualReport2012.pdf. 
23
 WEIMER, supra note 14, at 53.  
24
 Id.  
25
 Id. 
26
 42 C.F.R. §121.10(c)(1),(2), (i)-(iv). 
The bulk of the enforcement of OPTN policies and discipline comes primarily from the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. CMS requires that all hospitals performing 
transplants that participate in Medicare be OPTN members and adhere to the rules and policies 
promulgated by the OPTN and approved by the Secretary of HHS.
27
  
Part II- The Policies of the OPTN  
Informing the Donor and Recipient: Initial Steps 
The process of obtaining fully informed consent from both the donor and recipient begins 
at the first appointment and, in many ways, continues throughout the transplant process.
28
 The 
physicians involved are devoted and encouraged to address the importance of maintaining a 
healthy donor-recipient relationship.
29
 OPTN policies obligate transplant hospitals to provide 
educational lectures and tutorials to the donor so that he may comprehend the many emotional, 
physical, and mental obstacles that could, and likely will, arise.
30
 In doing so, it allows each 
individual to grasp the realities of the surgery and post-surgery life and, perhaps, defunct any 
notions of a risk-free, unchallenging experience.
31
 The functionality of this step in the informed 
consent process is to address significant concerns early in the donation so that no surprises which 
may affect the donor-recipient relationship arise later on.
32
   
                                                          
27
 42 C.F.R. §482.72 (2012).  
28
 See Dees, supra note 6, passim.  
29
 Id.at 328, 330. 
30
 ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., POLICY 12.0: 12.2 (a)-
(l):INFORMED CONSENT OF LIVING KIDNEY DONORS, at 12-1 to 12-3, available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf 
31
 See Dees, supra note 6, at 325. 
32
 See, e.g., ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 
POLICY12.2-INFORMED CONSENT OF LIVING DONORS: INTRODUCTION, at 12-1 (2013), available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf.; See also Michael M. Abecassis, 
John Friedewald, Elisa J. Gordon, Michael G. Ison, Daniel P. Ladner, Elizabeth Reddy, Kidney Transplant 
Candidates’ Understanding of Increased Risk Donor Kidneys: A Qualitative Study, 26 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 
359 (2012), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1399-0012.2011.01536.x/full. 
Independent Donor Advocates (IDAs)  
While the gift of an organ is considered an altruistic one, it still remains that each party to 
the transplantation procedure has interests and rights which must be protected.
33
 The donor, 
through OPTN policy and CMS rules, receives this protection, in part, in the form of an 
“Independent Donor Advocate”(IDA).34 OPTN and CMS policy require that all of its transplant 
hospitals provide the prospective donor with an IDA.
35
 The IDA serves to promote the best 
interests of the donors, promote their rights, and assist the donors in obtaining and understanding 
information as it pertains to each step of the transplantation process.
36
 This would include 
protecting the donors’ privacy as it pertains to the disclosure of risk behaviors learned of in the 
evaluation process.
37
 The IDA serves only the donor, and has no authority in final treatment 
decisions or in seeing the transplant through for the benefit of the recipient.
38
  
Consider the scenario in the introduction. Ted, the donor, could certainly voice his 
concerns to the IDA that is assigned to him over the policy of disclosing risk behaviors, but little 
could be done to address these concerns which would result in non-disclosure and donation, at 
least at this hospital. The IDA would likely advise Ted that at no point should he be willing to 
disclose this information unless he is entirely ready and is doing so voluntarily and for the 
appropriate reasons.
39
 The IDA would also protect Ted from any improper inducement or 
                                                          
33
 See Dees, supra note 6, passim. 
34
 42 C.F.R. 482.98(d) (2012); ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERV., POLICY 12.4: 12.4.1-IDEPENDENT DONOR ADVOCATES, at 12-8 to 12-9 (2013), available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf. 
35
 Id.  
36
 Id.; See also Dees, supra note 6, at 323, 324. 
37
 See Dees, supra note 6, at 323, 324. 
38
 42 C.F.R. 482.98(d)(3)(i)-(iii) (2012); ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, supra note 33.  
39
 ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., POLICY 12.0:12.3.4 
(L)-EXCLUSION CRITERIA, at 12-8 (2013), available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf; See also Beauvais, supra note 3, at 
2571-572; See also Dee, supra note 6, at 328. 
persuasive tactics of the transplant hospital in the event that they attempt to coerce him into 
agreeing to disclose.
40
  
Transplant Teams-Separate but Equal 
Concomitant to the protections offered the donor though the IDA, are those afforded the 
recipient by his/her “transplant team”.41 Each party to the transplant has its own team of doctors, 
referred to as the “transplant team”, that evaluate and prepare their respective patient for the 
procedure.
42
 The goals of the recipient transplant team are to ensure the likely outcome of the 
transplant is a promising one.
43
  In carrying out this goal, the team is to protect the interests of 
the recipient and take all ethical measures needed to guarantee the donor organ is medically 
suitable.
44
 The determination over what information is material to the decision-making process is 
left to the medical judgment of the respective transplant program.
45
 Some organ recipient 
advocates argue that this determination should be subjective one, and the materiality of any 
information should be left to the organ recipient.
46
  Researches have also found an overload of 
information can actually harm rational decision-making, stating, “more information may not 
always benefit the patient, especially in situations where the medical decision is complex, when 
there are many options, when the decision is acute and time-sensitive and when there is great 
uncertainty.” 47  Another study suggests that providing the information and obtaining specific 
informed consent actually results in higher utilization of increased risk organs, though this 
                                                          
40
  Patient’s Rights  42 C.F.R. 482.13(e) (2012); See also Dees, supra note 6, at 326. 
41
 See Dees, supra note 6, at 324, 325. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. at 325.  
44
 Id.  
45
 ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, supra note 2; See also, Dees, supra note 3, at 326. 
46
 See Dees, supra note 6, at 329; Contra, id. at 328 (standing for proposition that allowing a patient to determine 
which information is material will place too heavy a burden on the patient). 
47
  D. W. Hanto, K. Ladin,  Informed Consent and Living Kidney Donation: More (Information) Is Not Always 
Better, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION  2547, 2548 (2011) . 
pertains to transplants in the deceased donor context.
48
 Clearly, there is a lack of uniformity as to 
what is the appropriate amount of information to divulge to a transplant candidate.
49
 However, 
transplant programs remain free to determine their own policies as it pertains to the information 
they think should be disclosed to the potential recipient so long as the process remains in line 
with the vague regulatory authorities.
50
 
OPTN Policy12.0-Living Donation 
 The OPTN has policies specific to each and every possible transplant available.
51
 OPTN 
Policy 12.0-Living Donation generally dictates the requirements of its members as it pertains to 
living donations.
52
 The terms of this section expressly provide for the informing requirements 
owed to the donor by the hospital, the medical and psychological tests to be performed on the 
donor, and social and behavioral evaluations which must be completed prior to transplant 
approval.
53
 Though some of the rules within this section apply to all living donors, most pertain 
specifically to living kidney donation.
54
 The language of the policies in this section are quite 
general and do not limit the transplant programs’ ability to apply them, but instead, serve as a 
guideline with some articulated requirements.
55
 
                                                          
48
 C. Hanrahan, L.M. Kucirka, R.A. Montgomery, R. Namuyinga, D.L. Segev, Formal Policies and Special 
Informed Consent Are Associated with Higher Provider Utilization of CDC High-Risk Donor Organs, 9 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 629, 634 (2009), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1600-
6143.2008.02523.x/pdf. 
49
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50
 See Kuhnert, supra note 3, at 2570.  
51
 See, ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BYLAWS (2013), available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Bylaws.pdf#nameddest=Appendix_F. 
52
 ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., POLICY 12.0-LIVING DONATION (2013), 
available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id.  
The expressed informing obligations of the transplant hospital, in the context of a living 
kidney transplant, require it to disclose to the organ donor that the hospital will take “all 
reasonable measures to protect the confidentiality of the donor and recipient”.56 No definition is 
provided to define “reasonable measures”, which seems to leave the transplant hospital to use its 
best judgment.
57
 OPTN policy stipulates the transplant hospitals must inform the donor that all 
health information that is obtained during their evaluation “will be subject to the same 
regulations as all records and could reveal conditions that the transplant center must report to 
local, state, or federal public health authorities.”58 However, it does so without referencing the 
specific regulations that “all records” are subjected to, perhaps leaving the donor not as informed 
as she could be. The later part of the policy refers to mandatory reporting requirements which 
obligate transplant hospitals to disclose patient information, without authorization, for public 
health purposes.
59
 
 Conspicuously missing from the informed donor policies is any expressed requirement 
that the hospital obtain the donors consent in order to reveal health risks to the potential 
recipient. The lack of clarity only frustrates the goal of achieving uniformity in hospital policies 
and in fully informing donors as to their privacy protections.  A survey and study pertaining to 
disclosure of risk behaviors revealed many transplant surgeons do decide to reveal the risk 
behavior associated with an increased risk donor, at least in the deceased donor context.
60
 The 
study showed that 77% of 422 surgeons surveyed did reveal both the high risk status of the organ 
                                                          
56
ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, supra note 51, at 12-1, POLICY 12.2(c).  
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. at 12-3, POLICY 12.2(j). 
59
 ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., POLICY 7.0-DATA 
SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS (2013), available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_23.pdf. 
60
 See Hanrahan, supra note 47, at 631. 
and the behavior which lead to the designation.
61
 While privacy is not as much of a concern in 
the deceased donor contacts, the study may be read to mean that transplant surgeons do find the 
information relevant. 
 The Public Health Service (PHS) provides transplant programs with the list of risk 
behaviors that are used to designate organs as increased risk.
62
 OPTN policy requires transplant 
programs to use the PHS risk assessment guideline when conducting an evaluation of a donor in 
regards to questions pertaining to the donor’s past social and behavioral history.63 However, this 
evaluation is not limited to the questions set forth in the PHS guideline, allowing a transplant 
hospital to add to the list.
64
 These questions are designed to asses the risk of transmission for 
HIV, HBV, and HCV only.
65
  PHS guidelines limit disclosure to behaviors participated in during 
the preceding 12 months.
66
 However, this is the minimum required time frame. Transplant 
programs can adjust this time period as they deem fit. An affirmative answer to any of the 
questions results in the increased risk designation of the organ.
67
 The behaviors indicated by PHS 
to be included in the evaluation are the following: 
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 See Kuehnert, supra note 1, at 251.  
63
 ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., OPTN POLICIES: 
REWRITE PROJECT-15.3 IDENTIFICATION OF TRANSMISSIBLE DISEASES, at 192 (2013) (rewrite project was undertaken 
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64
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65
 Kuehnert, supra note 1, at 247. 
66
 Id. at 251. 
67
 Id. 
BEHAVIORS PARTICIPATED IN DURING THE PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
68
 
In 2011, approximately 7.7% of all transplants came from increased risk donors.
69
 
According to the PHS guideline, from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2011, there were 
134 reported transmissions of infectious diseases in recipients that were donor-derived.
70
  Of 
those 134, 104 came between 2008 and 2011.
71
 And of those 104, ten infections were of HCV, 
four were HBV, and one was HIV (the infections which the risk behaviors questionnaire are 
designed to address).
72
 The last living donor infection transmission occurred in 2009, where a 
man who had engaged in a risk behavior (sex with another male) transmitted HIV.
73
  However, 
stored specimens revealed that HIV was present in a pre-testing stage, though it may have gone 
                                                          
68
 Id. 
69
 Abecassis, supra note 37, at 359. 
70
 Kuehnert, supra note 1, at 259. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. at 260, 261. 
 Sex with anyone known to be infected with HIV, HBV, or HCV 
 Men who have had sex with other men 
 Women who have had sex with men that have had sex with other men in the preceding 12 months 
 People who have had sex in exchange for money or drugs 
 People who have had sex with a person who had sex in exchange for money or drugs in the 
preceding 12 months 
 People who have injected drugs through intravenous, intramuscular, or subcutaneous route for non-
medical reasons  
 People who have had sex with someone who has injected drugs though intravenous, intramuscular, 
or subcutaneous route for non-medical reasons in the preceding 12 months 
 People who have been in lock-up, jail, prison, or a juvenile correctional facility for more than 72 
consecutive hours 
 People newly diagnosed with, or have been treated for, syphilis, gonorrhea, Chlamydia, or genital 
ulcers 
 People who have been on hemodialysis 
overlooked.
74
 Much of the success in preventing transmission can be attributed to pre-testing 
procedures that can limit window periods for infections to as low as five days.
75
 This supports 
studies which indicate that remaining on the wait list is a far more dangerous to health than 
accepting a high risk organ.
76
 
 The guideline points to two major deficiencies in risk behavior policy, assessment, and 
guidance. Firstly, there is little data linking risk behaviors to actual transmissions of infections.
77
  
It states that testing recipients who receive increased risk organs is not required by OPTN policy 
and it is not the standard procedure of transplant hospitals.
78
 The guideline goes on to indicate 
that much information is needed before any certainty can be concluded about risk behaviors and 
their likely effect on rates of transmission.
79
 Secondly, and key to this discussion, is that the 
guideline points out major deficiencies in reliable research and the “paucity” of data regarding 
correlation between the listed risk behaviors and the likelihood the donor has a transmissible 
infection.
80
 A large portion of the guideline is dedicated to discerning what evidence the 
originators of the initial risk behavior guideline, released in 1994 and not substantially changed 
since, used in determining that there was a correlation between certain behaviors and infections 
of HIV, HCV, and HBV in those individuals.
81
 The authors found that low-quality evidence was 
used to create the list, and that, presently, for many of the behaviors, the jury is still out on rates 
of infection associated with the conduct.
82
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The guideline recommends, going forward, that national data be collected on HIV, HCV, 
and HBV transmission rates based on donor and recipient testing to better inform policy 
decisions and screening requirements.
83
  It is also suggested that data be collected on behavioral 
and non-behavioral risk factors associated with increased incidence and prevalence of HIV, 
HCV, and HBV amongst the potential donor population.
84
 Lastly, the guideline points out the 
quantitative deficiency associated with simply labeling an organ “increased risk or non-increased 
risk” and proposes that a numerical “risk index” be developed to help patients gauge the actual 
threat of infection from a high risk organ associated with a behavior.
85
  Such endeavors by the 
transplant community will go a long way in discerning what information is medically relevant in 
disclosure and evaluation policies.  
Policy 4.0-Identification of Transmissible Diseases in Organ Recipients 
 The OPTN addresses the minimum requirements for divulging increased risk organ status 
and obtaining informed consent to the organ through Policy 4.2-Requirements for Informed 
Consent Regarding risk of Transmissible Diseases.
86
 The language of the policy indicates that, 
“transplant programs must obtain informed consent prior to transplant of an organ when, in the 
transplant program’s medical judgment”, the donor: 
 Has a known medical condition which may be transmittable to the recipient, 
AND/ OR; 
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 The donor has been recognized increased risk for disease transmission 
(including, but not limited to, those specified in the PHS Guideline…)87  
        
The OPTN provides a list of those transmittable diseases which must be tested for prior to a 
living kidney transplantation.
88
 Where the transplant team has decided, in their medical 
judgment, that the tests reveal a risk that they feel requires the informed consent of the recipient, 
it will disclose the issue to the patient.
89
 In regards to risk behaviors, it is made clear in the PHS 
Guidelines that no quantitative value is attached to a risk behavior and its likelihood of 
transmission, rather, a qualitative indicia of “increased risk, or not increased risk” is all that is 
offered.
90
  
  Recipients are also informed that it is impossible to comprehensibly screen for all 
transmissible diseases or remove all risk of obtaining an infection after transplantation.
91
 Those 
recipients that do receive increased risk organs must have their consent documented.
92
 
Additionally, a strict post-operative care plan is offered to recipients of high risk organs so the 
hospital can monitor infections which may occur.
93
 It seems, through this process, all medically 
relevant information is imparted onto the recipient so that a fully informed decision can be made. 
It is not required anywhere in this policy that risk behaviors be disclosed. 
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Part III- CMS and Organ Transplantation Oversight 
 The Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services distinguishes its role from the OPTN by 
stating it is responsible for the oversight and compliance of the transplant community, whereas 
the OPTN serves to promote the equitable and efficient allocation of the organ supply.
94
 In part, 
the objective of CMS oversight is to address minimum standards of acceptable performance 
amongst transplant programs.
95
 CMS seeks to create expectations of performance and high 
quality transplant services through comparable performance measurements.
96
 In 2007, CMS 
promulgated conditions of participation (CoPs) for those transplant programs participating in 
Medicare and, thus, required transplant centers across the country to abide by the terms of the 
CMS regulations in order to obtain approval, or re-approval, of their respective institutions.
97
 As 
part of the conditions of participation, CMS set forth a section devoted to patient and living 
donor rights.
98
 The section provided that each transplant entity ensure the protection and 
promotion of the rights of both parties to a transplantation.
99
 
The Rights afforded Recipients through CMS Regulation: Informed Consent 
 In an effort to protect the rights of the transplant recipient, CMS issued its own rules as to 
the minimum criteria necessary to achieve fully informed consent.
100
 The rules require that 
transplant centers institute their own written policies of the informed consent process.
101
 Most 
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notably, in order for the transplant center’s informed consent policy to comply with CMS 
regulations, it obligates the entity to inform the candidate as to: the evaluation process, the 
surgical procedure, potential medical and psychosocial risks, organ donor risk factors that could 
affect the graft or health of the patient, and his or her right to refuse the treatment.
102
  CMS 
qualifies “donor risk factors” to include, but not limit, informing the patient of, “the donor’s 
history, condition or age of the organ used, and the patient’s potential risk of contracting HIV or 
other infectious diseases if the disease cannot be detected in an infected donor.” 103 “Donor 
history” is a term, however, that remains undefined. It could refer to donor’s relevant medical 
history, any significant family medical history, or the donor’s social behavioral history. This 
leaves the term open for interpretation by the transplant program.  
 The CMS regulations do not expressly distinguish between recipients of living donor 
high risk organs from those that receive high risk organs from deceased donors.
104
 Therefore, it 
could be presumed that the patients’ rights in the informed consent process and the information 
that are entitled to receive are the same in both types of transplants.
105
 Additionally, there is no 
rule limiting the transplant hospital’s ability to disclose other risk factors, outside of those stated 
in the CMS regulation, that the medical team finds are significant to the patient in making their 
decision.
106
 The CMS regulations dictate that the determination of what donor risk factors that 
should be disclosed to a recipient ought be left to the transplant surgeon, but that, at a minimum, 
all factors addressed in §482.102(a) should be discussed.
107
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CMS and Donors: Privacy Protections 
 The CMS protections afforded donor privacy in the living donor context are stated rather 
briefly in the regulations. Initial protection of patient privacy is provided in the conditions of 
participation which mandate that the patient maintain his right to personal privacy throughout the 
care process and that the clinical records of the patient be kept confidential.
 108
  CMS adds 
further protections for patients through its living donor consent requirements which obligate the 
transplant centers to inform the donor that all communications between the donor and the 
transplant center are “to remain confidential, and in accordance with the requirements proscribed 
under 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164”.109 The CFR provisions referenced in this rule are better 
known as The HIPAA Privacy Rule.
110
  
CMS and Protections Afforded under The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
 The terms of The HIPAA Privacy Rule dictate which disclosures of protected health 
information (PHI) require authorization and consent directly from the patient and which uses do 
not necessitate such written or oral permission.
111
 While organ procurement organizations fall 
outside of the control of these disclosure limitations, transplant hospitals are subjected to the 
provisions of the law.
112
 The sections of the HIPPA Privacy Rule discussed here illustrate the 
legal requirements covered entities have in protecting PHI, instances where covered entities are 
permitted to use PHI for particular purposes, and circumstances where authorization for 
disclosure is not required at all.  
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 The Privacy Rule requires all covered entities to advise patients of the legal duties the 
entity has in regards to keeping all PHI confidential.
113
 Where a particular treatment is being 
offered, the hospital must give adequate notice to the patient of the uses and disclosures of 
protected health information that may be made by the hospital in the course of that treatment.
114
 
The hospital must also advise the patient of his legal rights in regards to such information, which 
include: unrestrained access to his protected health information, the right to protest a disclosure, 
and access to a record that accounts for all disclosures of patient PHI.
115
 The notice must be 
written out in plain language for the patient and include examples of the types of disclosures 
which may occur.
116
 Patients retain the right to object to disclosures prior to treatment through 
entering into legally binding agreements with the hospital restricting the use of the 
information.
117
 However, the hospital does not have to agree to enter the restriction agreement 
simply because the patient disagrees with the disclosure.
118
  
 A hospital is permitted to use the PHI of a patient for the purposes of carrying out: 
treatment, payment, and healthcare operations.
119
 Hospitals do not have to obtain consent from 
the patient in using PHI where it concerns performing these functions of his care.
120
 However, 
the covered entity is limited to disclosing PHI to only those parties that are necessary to carry out 
the treatment of that patient.
121
  For instance, where the treatment of a third-party patient is 
concerned, another patient’s PHI is not permitted to be disclosed under this provision to aid in 
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the care of that third-party patient.
122
  It seems then that, in the context of a living donor 
transplant, where a hospital intends to use the PHI of the donor in obtaining the informed consent 
of the recipient, it must notify the donor of this intent, and must receive authorization and 
consent from the him to do so.  
Possible Loopholes for Unauthorized Disclosures for Transplant Hospitals in HIPAA 
 The Privacy Rule recognizes that health institutions must reveal certain medical 
information to particular entities and persons without having to receive the permission of the 
patient.
123
 This allowance is granted when, for instance, a medical or health entity is required to 
report information for the purposes of research, reporting is necessary for the benefit of the 
public health, or to notify institutions of a significant health threat.
124
 In the context of living 
transplantation, unauthorized disclosures will occur to satisfy OPTN reporting requirements, 
when the HHS or CMS makes a request for information, or when an infection occurs and those 
affected need to be notified.
125
  
 Transplantation is specifically referenced within the Privacy Rule in regards to deceased 
organ donation.
126
  It permits the use and disclosure of PHI by a covered entity to other 
transplant programs in the context of cadaveric organ, tissue, or eye donation and 
transplantation.
127
 There is no rule within the permitted unauthorized disclosures section that 
allows revealing the PHI of a living organ donor to an organ recipient without consent from the 
                                                          
122
 ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T FOR HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE FOR 
DONOR AND RECIPIENT INFORMATION SHARING 1, 4 (2012) (standing for proposition that information shared 
between donor and recipient in the living donor context requires HIPAA authorization), available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/Guidance_Information-Sharing_HIPAA_2012.pdf. 
123
 45 C.F.R. §164.510. 
124
 Id. 
125
 ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, supra note 122. 
126
 45 C.F.R. §164.512(h). 
127
 Id. 
donor. A transplant hospital could, perhaps, attempt to interpret the “threat to health” exception 
to allow an unauthorized disclosure of donor PHI because it permits unauthorized disclosures in 
order to avert a serious threat to health or safety.
128
  In order to do so, however, a covered entity 
must make a good faith determination that disclosure is necessary to “prevent or lessen a serious 
and imminent threat to a person”.129 It would be a far stretch for a transplant hospital to argue 
that the revelation of the risk behavior of an organ donor to the recipient falls under the 
exception. The legislation, likely, would have provided for an exception in the permitted 
unauthorized disclosures section to address the need to reveal the PHI of a living donor if it felt 
the circumstances required it.  
Part IV-Informed Consent and the Common Law 
 Informed consent, at common law, provides a patient with a legal remedy where he has 
been harmed because he was left unaware by the physician of information which would have 
played a significant role in his medical decision-making process.
130
  The common law 
development of informed consent has played a pivotal role in preventing patients from being left 
with inadequate information when making a medical decision.
131
 Particularly, the courts have 
found that the informed consent theory has come to illustrate and uphold the fiduciary 
relationship between the physician and the patient, and the duties owed by the physician in that 
relationship.
132
 Physicians are thus required to disclose to patients, prior to treatment, the risks 
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associated with a particular type of treatment, the likelihood of such risks occurring, alternatives 
to the treatment, and any other medically relevant information that could affect the decision-
making of the patient.
133
  
 A physician has a duty to disclose to a patient information that will enable him to 
consider and weigh knowledgeably the options for medical treatment available and the risk 
attendant to each.
134
  In some states, the approach is not what the reasonable patient would want 
to know, but rather, what the prudent physician would disclose as so the procedure.
135
 This 
deviates from other views, such as New Jersey, which consider informed consent to be a patient 
centered concept. An action for breach of informed consent, in most states, is based upon failure 
to disclose a material risk of a proposed treatment that would compel a reasonable person in that  
patient’s position to reject the treatment.136 Where a patient/plaintiff is bringing an action for a 
physician’s failure to obtain informed consent, the plaintiff must prove: 
1. Doctor failed to give plaintiff all material information that a reasonable person 
in the plaintiff’s position would expect a doctor to disclose so that plaintiff could 
make informed decision about course of treatment 
2. The undisclosed risk occurred 
3. A reasonable person under the circumstances of this case would not have 
consented to the treatment or operation had they been so informed AND 
4. The course of treatment or operation was a proximate cause in producing 
plaintiff’s injuries or conditions 137 
                                                          
133
 Id. at 548 (citing Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 459, 457 A.2d 431 (1983)). 
134
 Caputa v. Antiles, 296 N.J. Super. 123, 133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“predicated on the duty of a 
physician to disclose to a patient such information as will enable the patient to make an evaluation of the nature of 
the treatment and of any attendant substantial risks, as well as of available options in the form of alternative 
therapies (quoting Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 208 (1988))). 
135
 Willis v. Bender, 593 F.3d 1244, 1255-256 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Wyoming uses the reasonable professional 
standard”). 
136
 Saks v. Ng, 383 N.J. Super. 76, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (the test for materiality is based upon 
whether a patient in the plaintiff’s position would consider the risk material (citing  Matthies v. 
Mastromonaco, 160 N.J. 26, 36 (1999))). 
137
 Id. at 94. 
 The elements listed above apply to those states that take the patient-centered approach to 
informed consent.
138
  The determination of what information is to be disclosed to a patient is 
considered “not subjective as to either the physician or the patient, but rather, it 
remains objective with due regard for the patient's informational needs and with suitable leeway 
for the physician's situation.”139  For instance, a patient highly susceptible to contracting a 
particular disease due to a personal immunodeficiency must be informed of that risk, whereas 
another patient may not face the same threat and thus, does not require the information because 
the threat is not material. Therefore, a risk cannot be presumed material and is instead a question 
left to the finders of fact.
140
 
 It is not what that plaintiff would have decided if properly advised, but what a reasonably 
prudent person in the plaintiff’s position would have decided if fully informed.141 A subjective 
characteristic of a patient, such as a bias against homosexuals, cannot be considered when 
determining whether information is material to the medical decision-making process.
142
 It 
beckons the court to ask whether or not knowing such information would have changed the 
decision of the reasonable patient and would the outcome had been different for the patient if the 
information had been disclosed.
143
 
  In Adamski v. Moss, 271 NJ Super. 513 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1994), the Court 
concluded that knowledge of a risk in the medical community could be established through the 
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defendant’s expert or by use of medical literature.144 This is a practical and substantial 
consideration when placed in the context of the informed donor recipient. It beckons the 
transplant community to determine whether knowledge of risk behaviors and their possible 
effects on transmission rates has been substantially accepted in the medical community and 
whether this knowledge impacts recipient outcomes.  
 Informed consent lawsuits have been brought against hospitals that were unable to detect 
an infection prior to the transplant.
145
 The claim in Baylor University Medical Center v. Biggs, 
237 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. App. 2007), was brought following an infection from a cadaveric organ.
146
 
The plaintiff was the recipient of an organ infected with rabies that died about a month after the 
transplant.
147
 The plaintiff’s estate argued that the transplant hospital, and it’s surgeons, failed to 
inform the decedent as to the high risk nature of the organ donor and, if they had, the decedent 
would have declined the organ.
148
 The court evaluated the informed consent claim under the 
rules of the state which required the plaintiff to show the “undisclosed risk would have 
influenced a reasonable person in making a decision to consent to the procedure.”149  It found 
that while that informed consent claim could certainly be brought and upheld in these 
circumstances, the plaintiff’s expert reports failed to establish the proper standard of care, the 
breach, and the causation which connecting the breach to the injury.
150
 Specifically, the court 
pointed to shortcomings in establishing the proper procedure for informed consent in 
                                                          
144
 Adamski v. Moss, 271 NJ Super. 513, 517 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1994). 
145
 Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. V. Biggs, 237 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. App. 2007). 
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. at 914. 
148
 Id. 
149
 Id. 
150
 Id. at 922, 923.  
transplantation, whose duty it was to disclose the information, and whether it was possible to 
discern the status of the deceased donor at the time of the transplant.
151
 
 I am persuaded that the most appropriate application of informed consent in the medical 
context requires one to ask, “Would a reasonable patient find the information material in making 
a medical decision?” Materiality must be an objective measure in this case, and there is simply 
no support that any degree of certainty has been concluded in regards to the actual effects 
disclosing the risk behaviors of a donor has on infection transmission rates or successful 
transplantation.
152
 While certain patients may, in fact, change their minds upon learning of the 
risk behavior associated with the status of the organ, I do not believe the objectively reasonable, 
prudent patient would. The recipient is made aware of a risk, that being the possibility of 
transmission, for which the cause of has no effect on the impact or severity of that risk.   The 
ethical considerations concerning the privacy of the donor and the legal protections afforded him, 
must, as a result, be paramount to the need to disclose. 
Part V-Paired Exchange and Other Alternative to Risk Behavior Disclosure 
 All transplant candidates are permitted to enter and utilize the “Paired Exchange” 
program.
153
 The Paired Exchange program is used when a transplant candidate has a willing 
donor, but that living donor is not a compatible kidney match with the recipient. Consider the 
following: Donor-Recipient Pair1 have incompatible kidneys. Donor-Recipient Pair 2 is also 
incompatible. However, the Donor in Pair 1 is compatible with the Recipient in Pair 2. Likewise, 
the Donor in Pair 2 is compatible with the Recipient in Pair 1.  The Paired Exchange program 
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will orchestrate a transplantation where the Donor in Pair 1donates his organ to the Recipient in 
Pair 2, and the Donor in Pair 2 donates his organ to the Recipient in Pair 1.
154
   
 This exchange could be completed while maintaining the confidentiality of any 
personally identifiable information of either of the donors as to the recipients.  Where a donor is 
not willing to consent to having his risk behaviors disclosed to the known recipient, he should be 
offered the opportunity to place his organ on the Paired Exchange list where his personally 
identifiable information can be left confidential. Though the donor in our scenario is actually 
compatible, his reasons for being more comfortable with the paired exchange need not be 
revealed to the recipient.  
Conclusion  
 This paper has presented and analyzed the transplantation process, the protections and 
rights afforded donors and recipients in it, and the legal sources for those rights and protections.  
It discussed the vagueness associated with many of the requirements placed upon transplant 
programs in following the rules and policies administered, and the broad interpretation 
allowances the overseeing agencies permit the programs to use when developing in-house 
protocol related to informed consent and privacy procedures.  
 The policy requirements thrust upon transplant programs though the Organ Procurement 
and Transplant Network and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, I find, fully provide 
for the legal informed consent of the organ recipient. Furthermore, the expressed legal 
protections afforded donors under CMS regulations and through HIPAA do not permit such 
unauthorized revelations of protected medical information. There exists too little information, 
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both quantitative and qualitative, to scientifically correlate risk behaviors to infections and their 
actual effect on transmission rates. While the CMS regulations call for the transplant programs to 
initiate discussions about donor history with the recipient, such a discussion can be limited to the 
risks posed by the donor’s history without revealing personal privacy matters.  It is essential that 
the ethical concerns of the donor be appropriately recognized and protected in this case. 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
